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A Note on the Use of Debt by 
Venture Capital Backed Firms
Rick H. Mull 
Drew B. Winters
Much of the current research regarding the venture capitalist examines samples of ven­
ture capital (VC) backed firms rather than the venture capitalist itself. While VC backed 
firms may represent the most reasonable proxy available for the study of the venture 
capitalist, consideration of firm-specific characteristics may need to be included to mit­
igate biased conclusions. Controlling for the determinants of capital structure, we 
examine the persistence of previously noted differences in capital structure choice and 
find that VC backing does not systematically alter the use of debt by firms. These 
results suggest that not controlling for firm specific differences when contrasting VC 
and non-VC backed firms may lead to inaccurate conclusions in venture capital 
research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the current research in the certification, monitoring, and capital funding 
roles of the venture capitalist examines samples of venture capital (VC) backed 
firms rather than the venture capitalist itself. While VC backed firms may repre­
sent the most reasonable proxy available for the study of the venture capitalist, 
consideration of firm-specific characteristics may need to be included to mitigate 
biased conclusions. The primary purpose of this note is to show that not control­
ling for the underlying firm-specific characteristics in VC and non-VC backed 
firm cross-sectional studies may result in erroneous conclusions.
To illustrate, consider the Megginson and Weiss (1991) (MW) venture capital 
certification article finding that venture capital (VC) backed firms use less debt 
than a matched sample of non-venture capital (non-VC) backed firms. ^  Also con­
sider Sahlman (1990), who notes that venture capitaUsts invest in stages to reduce 
their exposure to risk of project failure (34.5% of projects examined resulted in
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losses). This suggests high levels of risk associated with VC backed firms. While 
together both results are consistent with Myers’ (1977) point that risky invest­
ments are best funded with equity, they also suggest that there may be fundamental 
capital structure differences between the VC and non-VC backed firms. Thus, the 
question is raised whether VC and non-VC backed firm capital structure differ­
ences are the result of systematic differences between the two sets of firms.
We determine whether differences in capital structure choice found by MW 
persist after the consideration of firm-specific differences. If they do not, then 
these findings highlight the importance of controUing for firm-specific character­
istics in reducing biased conclusions when using VC backed firms to study the 
venture capitalist.
Controlling for the determinants of capital structure as described in Titman 
and Wessels (1988), we find that VC backed firms do not systematically use less 
debt than non-VC backed firms, suggesting that VC backed firms have different 
firm specific characteristics than do non-VC backed firms. After controlling for 
firm specific characteristics influencing capital structure choice, we find that VC 
involvement does not systematically alter capital structure choice. Even more 
importantly, these results suggest that not controlling for firm specific differences 
when contrasting VC and non-VC backed firms may lead to incorrect conclusions 
in venture capital research.
II. MEGGINSON AND WEISS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
The sample used in MW consists of 320 VC backed firms matched with 320 non- 
VC backed firms having IPOs between January 1983 and December 1987. The 
firms are first matched by IPO offer size and then three digit SIC code. Financial 
information is obtained from microfiched IPO prospecti (S-l’s), each containing 
three to five years of historical data. This study uses the original MW sample and 
eUminates firms with missing required variables. The final sample consists of a 
matched set of 119 VC and 119 non-VC backed firms.
MW present mean and median difference tests for several sample variables. Of 
importance in this study are debt level differences. Tests for mean debt level dif­
ferences between VC (31.3%) and non-VC (32.9%) backed firms are insignificant. 
However, median difference tests show that VC backed firms have significantly 
lower book value of debt to book value of total assets ratios than do non-VC 
backed firms (16.0% VC backed to 21.5% non-VC backed).
MW do not specifically address the basis for these capital structure differ­
ences. This paper extends their analysis to determine whether these variations are 
related to VC backing or to firm-specific characteristics. We do this by employing 
Titman and Wessels’ model to control for firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure.
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III. TITMAN AND WESSELS METHODOLOGY
Titman and Wessels identify eight major determinants of capital structure; (1) col­
lateral value, (2) non-debt tax shields, (3) growth, (4) firm uniqueness, (5) indus­
try, (6 ) size, (7) profit volatility, and (8 ) profitability. They additionally identify 
fifteen proxies for these eight (not directly observable) determinants, with each 
determinant having several available proxies.
The factor analytic procedure they use (available as the LISREL procedure in 
SPSS) allows specific relationships between the fifteen proxies and the eight deter­
minants to be identified in a measurement model:^
x = + 5 (1)
with:
x = 15 X 1 vector of fifteen observable proxies 
^ = 8 x 1 vector of eight unobservable determinants 
A = 15 X 8  matrix of regression-coefficients of x on ^
6  = 15 X 1 v e c to r  o f  erro rs o f  m e a su r e m e n t
The factor analytic procedure also estimates a structural equation model by simul­
taneously identifying the relationship between the eight determinants estimated 
above (for which fifteen proxies are identified) and three observable firm debt 
ratios as follows:
y = r^  + e (2 )
with:
y = 3  X 1 vector of observable firm debt ratios
^ = 8 x 1 vector of eight unobservable determinants
r  = 3  X 3  matrix of factor loadings (regression coefficients)
8  = 3 x 1 vector of disturbance terms
Titman and Wessels use this estimation procedure with a sample of public firms 
between 1974 and 1982 for which data was available on the Annual Compustat 
Industrial files. They evaluate their model and find significant relationships between 
all fifteen proxies and the eight capital structure determinants. They also find several 
significant relationships between the eight capital structure determinants and both 
short and long-term measures of both book and market values of debt ratios.
rV. OUR MODEL AND RESULTS
We begin our analysis by verifying the Megginson and Weiss findings using non- 
parametric tests on firm total debt to total equity ratios (TDTE). For consistency
The Use of Debt 289
with Titman and Wessels, we examine the ratio of total debt to total equity rather 
than the total debt to total asset ratio used in MW. We then examine the use of debt 
by VC backed and non-VC backed firms, controlling for firm specific determinant 
of capital structure. We use a subset of the MW sample, excluding firms without 
the financial data required by the Titman and Wessels model, and use financial 
data from two fiscal years prior to the firm’s IPO.
We find that the median of TDTE for non-VC backed firms is 1.89, while the 
median of TDTE for VC backed firms is 1.22. Wilcoxon and median difference 
tests are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that VC backed firms use less debt 
than non-VC backed firms. Although we use a different debt measure, these results 
are consistent with the findings of MW. We now examine whether these observed 
VC backed and non-VC backed firm debt level differences persist after controlling 
for specific firm characteristics that influence capital structure choice.
Using the LISREL procedure to control for the determinants of capital struc­
ture, we begin by re-estimating the Titman and Wessels model on our dataset. Our 
measurement model results show significant relationships between the eight deter­
minants and the 15 proxies. Our results are similar to those found by Titman and 
Wessels.^ However, our structural equation model produces no significant rela-
Table 1
Model to determine differences in capital structure between venture capital (VC) backed 
and non-venture capital (non-VC) backed firms with the total book value o f debt to total 
book value o f equity ratio as the dependent variable. This model was developed by a LIS­
REL analysis to identify the single most significant proxy for each o f the eight capital 
structure determinants.
TDTE = po + Pi(CV) + P2(NDT) + p3(VO) + p4(U) + p5(S) + |36(G) + P7(P) + Pg(IDUM) +
P9(VC) +
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With model variables defined as:
Debt Ratio IDTE = total book value of debt / total book value of equity
Collateral Value CV = (inventory + gross plant and equipment) /  total assets.
Non-Debt Tax Shield NOT = depreciation / total assets.
Volatility VO = range in earnings / earnings in the last year of range. ^
Uniqueness U = selling expense / total assets.
Size S = natural logarithm of sales.
Growth Rate G = continuously compounded growth rate in total assets.
Profitability P = operating income/ total assets.
Industry IDUM = 1 if SIC code 3400 to 4000 and 0 otherwise.b
Venture Capital Backing VC = 1 for VC backed and 0 for non-VC backed firms.
Notes: a. Volatility is measured as the range in earnings from two years prior to the IPO to just prior to the IPO 
(two years of data), divided by earnings just prior to the IPO. Titman and Wessels use a much longer 
horizon to measure volatility, however our data precludes this measure, 
b. Titman and Wessels argue that manufacturers of specialized equipment, those in the 3400 to 4000 SIC 
code, face unique liquidation costs in the event of a bankruptcy. We include this control variable in 
our analysis.
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Table 2
Ordinary least squares regression to determine differences in capital structure between a 
matched sample of 119 venture capital (VC) backed and 119 non-venture capital (non-VC) 
backed firms with the total book value of debt to total book value of equity ratio as the 
dependent variable. Model variables are defined below.
Variables Coefficient T-statistic
Intercept 1.007 (3.827)*
CV (Collateral Value) 1.466 (4.040)*
NDT (Non-Debt Tax Shield)
-0.061 (-0.091)
VO (Volatility) 0.006 (0.807)
U (Uniqueness)
-0.141 (-0.490)
S (Size) 0.026 (0.528)
G (Growth Rate) -0.007 (-0.396)
P (Profitability) 0.541 (2.378)*
IDUM (Industry) -0.396 (-2.181)*
VC (Venture Capital Backing) 0.078 (0.414)
Adj. R-sq. .152
F-statistic 4.839*
Notes: *indicates the estimate is significant at the 5% level.
Debt Ratio (TDTE) = total book value of debt /  total book value of equity. Col­
lateral Value (CV) = (inventory + gross plant and equipment) /  total assets. Non- 
Debt Tax Shield (NDT) = depreciation / total assets. Volatility (V 0)= range in 
earnings /  earnings in the last year of range. Uniqueness (U)= selling expense / 
total assets. Size (S)= natural logarithm of sales. Growth Rate (G)= continuously 
compounded growth rate in total assets. Profitability (P)= operating income/ total 
assets. Industry (IDUM)= 1 if SIC code 3400 to 4000 and 0 otherwise. Venture 
Capital Backing (VC) = 1 for firms with venture capital backing and 0 for non­
venture capital backed firms.
tionships between the eight determinants of capital structure and our book values 
of debt ratios." ’^^
Being unable to complete our analysis using the full LISREL model, we 
employ an alternative procedure. We identify the significant relationships between 
proxies and determinants in the measurement model and use the single most signif­
icant proxy for each determinant to estimate firm capital structure. Our model is 
presented in Table 1 and uses a single proxy for each determinant and an additional 
dunmiy variable to control for VC backing.
Table 2 reports the results from OLS regression estimation of our model.^ 
Regression results find collateral value (CV) and profitability (P) significant and 
positive, and the industry dummy (IDUM) variable significant and negative. The 
model also explains 15.2% of cross-sectional variability. The venture capital back­
ing (VC) dummy is insignificant, which suggests no difference in debt levels 
between VC and non-VC backed firms when controlling for capital structure 
determinants. This result differs from both MW and our median difference tests, 
and suggests that, after controlling for the firm specific characteristics of capital
Structure, VC backing is not a significant determinant of firm capital structure 
choice. Importantly, this result suggests that in this matched sample, venture capi­
talists invest in firms whose characteristics do not support the use of as much debt 
as the non-VC capital backed firms. These findings underscore the importance of 
controlling for firm specific differences during empirical examinations on the role 
of the venture capitalist.
V. CONCLUSION
We show that after controlling for the firm specific characteristics of capital struc­
ture that there is no difference in the debt levels of VC and non_VC backed firms. 
These results suggest that venture capitalists do not alter the capital structure 
choice of the firms they back. Rather, capital structure choice and soliciting ven­
ture capital backing may both be endogenous to the firm’s investment opportunity 
set or other firm specific characteristics.^ More importantly, and the primary pur­
pose of this note, our results illustrate that differing firm characteristics should be 
controlled for in studies of cross-sectional differences between venture and non­
venture capital backed firms. Not considering these factors may lead to omitted 
variables, model mis-specification, and erroneous conclusions.
NOTES
1. The seminal work of Megginson and Weiss regarding venture capital certification extends far 
beyond this single point. We use this single example only to illustrate our point.
2. For a discussion of the LISREL procedure and factor analytic models see Bentler (1983), 
Joreskog (1977), and Joreskog and Sorbom (1985).
3. Sheridan Titman graciously provided us with their origial LISREL code. Since we are using a 
newer version of LISREL, LISREL IV, we first test our procedure on an approximated replica­
tion of Titman and Wessels original dataset, and find results similar to theirs.
4. The LISREL procedure simultaneously estimates the covariance structures of both the measure­
ment and structural equation models. Sample size is a significant constraint in the LISREL pro­
cedure, particularly when using large numbers of proxies, capital structure determinants, and 
debt measures (relative to sample size). After eliminating firms without the data required for the 
LISREL analysis, we are left with a sample of 238 firms. We believe that this is the primary rea­
son for our lack of significance between the determinants of capital structure and firm debt mea­
sures.
5. Since our results for the measurement model are similar to the Titman and Wessels model, we 
do not present the results of our estimation in tabular form. These tables are available upon 
request. Also, our method for calculating some proxies differs slightly from Titman and Wessels 
due to data limitations in our sample. Since our resuhs are similar to theirs, we believe our meth­
ods of proxy calculation are reasonable.
6. We believe that identifying the single most significant proxy for each determinant of capital 
structure in the measurement model avoids the employment of an ad hoc procedure. An exami­
nation of model variables, including the dummy variable for venture capital backing (VC), show
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the highest correlations to be (1) S to P of 0.42, (2) S to G of -0.40 and (3) S to CV of 0.40. All 
other correlations are below 0.25. A test for model multi-collinearity finds that the model is not 
poorly defined. Given that we need one proxy for each of the eight determinants of capital struc­
ture, we believe the model is reasonable for testing capital structure. Removing S from the model 
does not alter the interpretation of the results.
7. It may be true that venture capitalists may affect firm specific variables such as size and profit­
ability. However, the question that remains is whether markets react to the presence of venture 
capital, to firm specific characteristics, or to a combination of both. Our findings suggest that 
market discipline does not treat VC and non-VC backed firms differently when considering firm 
capital structure.
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